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Abstract
We recently performed cognitive experiments on conjunctions and negations of two concepts with the
aim of investigating the combination problem of concepts. Our experiments confirmed the deviations
(conceptual vagueness, underextension, overextension, etc.) from the rules of classical (fuzzy) logic
and probability theory observed by several scholars in concept theory, while our data were successfully
modeled in a quantum-theoretic framework developed by ourselves. In this paper, we isolate a new,
very stable and systematic pattern of violation of classicality that occurs in concept combinations. In
addition, the strength and regularity of this non-classical effect leads us to believe that it occurs at a
more fundamental level than the deviations observed up to now. It is our opinion that we have identified
a deep non-classical mechanism determining not only how concepts are combined but, rather, how they
are formed. We show that this effect can be faithfully modeled in a two-sector Fock space structure, and
that it can be exactly explained by assuming that human thought is the supersposition of two processes,
a ‘logical reasoning’, guided by ‘logic’, and a ‘conceptual reasoning’ guided by ‘emergence’, and that the
latter generally prevails over the former. All these findings provide a new fundamental support to our
quantum-theoretic approach to human cognition.
Keywords: Cognition, concept theory, quantum modeling, concept formation
1 Introduction
An increasing amount of data collected in cognitive psychology reveal that the traditional set-based
(Boolean, Bayesian, Kolmogorovian, etc.) models of cognition give rise to fundamentally problematic
predictions when applied to human decision making (probability and similarity judgments, concept cat-
egorization, natural language processing, behaviour under uncertainty, etc.). In concept theory, these
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difficulties manifest whenever one tries to apply the prescriptions of classical (fuzzy set) logic and classical
probability theory to express the representation of the combination of two or more concepts in terms of
the representation of the individual concepts. This problem is known in the literature as the ‘combination
problem’, and it was specifically raised by the following findings.
(i) ‘Pet-fish problem’. Osherson and Smith considered the ‘typicality’ of specific exemplars with respect
to the concepts Pet, Fish and their conjunction Pet-Fish [1, 2], and noted that people rate an exemplar
such as Guppy as a very typical example of Pet-Fish, without rating Guppy as a very typical example of
neither Pet nor Fish (‘guppy effect’). Therefore, the ‘minimum rule’ of fuzzy set conjunction does not hold
in the situation of the guppy effect.
(ii) ‘Overextension and underextension of membership weights’. Hampton measured the ‘membership
weight’ of several exemplars with respect to specific pairs of concepts and their conjunction [3] and disjunc-
tion [4], finding systematic deviations from both the minimum and the maximum fuzzy set rule. Adopting
an accepted terminology, we say that the membership weight of an exemplar x is ‘overextended’ (‘double
overextended’) with respect to the conjunction ‘A and B’ of two concepts A and B if the membership
weight of x with respect to ‘A and B’ is higher than the membership weight of x with respect to one
concept (both concepts) (briefly, x is overextended with respect to the conjunction). Overextension is an
example of violation of the minimum fuzzy set rule. Analogously, we say that the membership weight of
an exemplar x is ‘underextended’ (‘double underextended’) with respect to the disjunction ‘A or B’ of two
concepts A and B if the membership weight of x with respect to ‘A or B’ is less than the membership
weight of x with respect to one concept (both concepts) (briefly, x is underextended with respect to the
disjunction).
(iii) ‘Deviations from Boolean logical rules in conceptual negation’. Hampton also measured the mem-
bership weights of various exemplars with respect to specific pairs of concepts and their conjunction, e.g.,
Tools Which Are Also Weapons, and also conjunction when the second concept is negated, e.g., Tools
Which Are Not Weapons [5]. He detected overextension in both types of conjunctions, as well as deviations
from classical logical behaviour in conceptual negation.
(iv) ‘Sorites-type paradoxes and borderline contradictions’. A borderline contradiction can be formal-
ized as a sentence of the form P (x) ∧ ¬P (x), for a vague predicate P and a borderline case x, e.g., the
sentence “Mark is rich and Mark is not rich” [6]. Alxatib and Pelletier asked human subjects to estimate
the truth value of a sentence such as “x is tall and not tall” for a given person x who was showed to the
eyes of the subjects [7]. They found that a significant number of subjects estimated such a sentence as
true, in particular, for borderline cases.
Difficulties (i)–(iv) entail, in particular, that the formation and combination rules of human concepts
do not generally follow the laws of classical (fuzzy set) logic [1, 2, 3, 4, 5]. And, more generally, the
corresponding experimental data cannot be modeled in a single classical probability space satisfying the
axioms of Kolmogorov [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13].
These and other discoveries in experimental psychology led several scholars, including ourselves, to
develop more general mathematical formalisms to model cognitive dynamics and processes. Among these
alternatives approaches, a very promising one is the ‘quantum cognition approach’, which uses the mathe-
matical formalism of quantum theory [8, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29]. Following on our quantum-theoretic approach to human cognition, we recently performed a set
of cognitive experiments on conceptual conjunctions of the form ‘A and B’, ‘A and B′’, ‘A′ and B’, and ‘A′
and B′’, where A′ and B′ denote the negations of the natural concepts A and B, respectively. We identified
systematic deviations from classicality in the form of overextension, as well as double overextension. We
thus confirmed the empirical results on concept combinations mentioned above. In addition, we faithfully
modeled our experimental data by naturally extending a two-sector Fock space model previously worked
out by ourselves [13, 30].
2
In this paper we present our recent findings on the identification of quantum structures in the com-
bination of natural concepts. More specifically, our investigation of the simultaneous representability of
conjunctions and negations in Sec. 2 leads to five conditions, which should be satisfied by the data to fit
together into one classical probability setting. Analysing the deviations of our data with respect to these
five conditions, we find a very strong systematic pattern which is also very stable, in the sense that it gives
rise to the same numerical values for the deviation even over the different pairs of concepts that we have
experimented on.
Inquiring into this regular pattern of violation in Sec. 3, we show how it constitutes a very strong
evidence for the presence and dominance of what we have called ‘conceptual emergence’ in our earlier work
on Fock space modeling of conceptual combinations [10, 11, 22, 12, 13]. That the violation is numerically
the same independent of the considered pair of concepts indicates that we have identified a non-classical
mechanism in human thought which is linked to the depth of concept formation itself and to its intrinsic
nature, independent of the specific meaning for a specific pair of concepts and a specific set of considered
exemplars.
This was for ourselves the most surprising and unexpected result of the investigation that we present in
this paper, and we also consider it as one of the most important of our findings with respect to the modeling
of human cognition. In our opinion it inescapably proves that human thought does not follow the rules
of classical probability, and that this deviation of classical probability is strong and takes place on a deep
structural conceptual level. Let us stress in this respect that this overwhelming systematics of deviation
of classicality ‘could not be detected in the foregoing studies on conjunctions and disjunctions of pairs of
concepts, since these were not considering also negations and their combinations’ [3, 4, 5, 10, 11, 12, 13].
Indeed, these studies focused on only identifying overextension or underextension, hence they ‘could not
reveal the systematic deviation we detect here, by lack of symmetry’. It was necessary to experiment
on conjunction and negation together and derive the five classicality conditions containing the necessary
symmetry, to be able to identify this strong and stable pattern of deviation of classicality.
The second important finding we present in this paper is related to the same identification of the
‘deviation of classicality pattern’ over all the considered pairs of concepts and their negations. Indeed,
we not only find a strong and stable numerical deviation independent of the considered concepts and
exemplars, but we additionally show in Sec. 5 that the numerical size of the deviation is ‘almost’ equal
to the deviation of our five classicality conditions ‘if we substituted the theoretical values for an average
quantum model by means of our Fock space model of the situation’. Hence, as a second, equally unexpected
and for ourselves surprising result, the data indicate in a very strong way that the deviation is exactly the
one that would theoretically be found in case the situation is modelled quantum mechanically by our Fock
space model.
Following the above mentioned results we believe our findings to be a strong support for the validity
of our quantum-theoretic framework in two-sector Fock space, which we summarize in Sec. 4, and also for
our explanatory hypothesis that human reasoning is the superposition of a dominant emergent dynamics
and a secondary logical dynamics [31]. In fact, they indicate that the human mind generally combines the
concepts A and the negation B′ of the concept B by forming a new concept ‘A and B′’, which emerges as
an independent conceptual entity. But, superposed to this mechanism, a second dynamics acts, where the
new concept ‘A and B′’ is recognized as a logical combination of A and B′. Our two-sector Fock space is
a mathematical framework for representing faithfully these processes, as we conclude in Sec. 6.
2 Non-classicality in conceptual conjunctions and negations
Our experiments involved 40 human subjects, chosen among our colleagues and friends, and exposed to a
‘within-subjects design’. This is the typical number of participants in a cognitive experiment estimating
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conceptual membership – in particular, Hampton’s experiments, which our experiments directly compare
with, employed 40 participants [3, 4]. We asked the 40 subjects to fill in a questionnaire in which they
had to estimate the membership of four sets C(A,B) of exemplars with respect to four pairs (A,B) of
natural concepts, and their conjunctions ‘A and B’, ‘A and B′’, ‘A′ and B’ and ‘A′ and B′’, where A′
and B′ denote the negations of the concepts A and B, respectively. Hence, for each pair (A,B) of natural
concepts, the 40 participants were involved in four subsequent experiments, eAB , eAB′ , eA′B and eA′B′ ,
eXY corresponding to the conjunction ‘X and Y ’, X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′.
For each pair, we considered a set of 24 exemplars and measured their membership with respect to
these pairs of concepts and the conjunctions above. For example, for the pair (Fruits, Vegetables), we
firstly asked the 40 subjects to estimate the membership of 24 exemplars – Apple, Parsley, Olive, Chili
Pepper, Broccoli, . . . , Almond, . . . – with respect to the concepts Fruits, Vegetables, and their conjunction
Fruits And Vegetables. Then, we asked the same 40 subjects to estimate the membership of the same
exemplars with respect to the concept Fruits, the negation Not Vegetables of the concept Vegetables, and
their conjunction Fruits And Not Vegetables. Subsequently, we asked the 40 subjects to estimate the
membership of the 24 exemplars with respect to the negation Not Fruits of the concept Fruits, the concept
Vegetables, and their conjunction Not Fruits And Vegetables. Finally, we asked the 40 subjects to estimate
the membership of the 24 exemplars with respect to the negations Not Fruits, Not Vegetables, and their
conjunction Not Fruits And Not Vegetables. Thus, in each experiment, a given subject was asked to provide
24 · 4 · 3 = 288 judgements, for an overall number of 288 · 4 = 1152 judgements.
The choice of the exemplars and pairs of concepts was inspired by the experiments Hampton performed
on the disjunction of two concepts [4]. We chose four of the eight pairs of concepts tested by Hampton,
together with the same set of exemplars, for each pair. This choice is part of a more general research
program in which we want to investigate the validity of specific logical rules, such as de Morgan’s laws, in
concept combinations.
We estimated conceptual membership by using a ‘7-point scale’. The subjects were asked to choose a
number from the set {+3,+2,+1, 0,−1,−2,−3}, where the positive numbers +1, +2 and +3 meant that
they considered ‘the exemplar to be a member of the concept’, where +3 indicated a strong membership,
+1 a relatively weak membership. The negative numbers −1, −2 and −3 meant that the subject considered
‘the exemplar to be a non-member of the concept’, where −3 indicated a strong non-membership, −1 a
relatively weak non-membership. We finally converted these ‘membership or non-membership’ estimations
into relative frequencies and, in the limit of large numbers, into probabilities, or ‘membership weights’.
More concretely, the membership weight µ(A and B) is the large number limit of the relative frequency for
the exemplar x to be a member of ‘A and B’ in the experiment eAB , hence the probability µ(A and B) can
be associated with the event ‘the exemplar x is a member of the concept A’. We get the relative frequency
by converting the values collected on the 7-point scale and associating a value +1 to each positive value
on the 7-point scale, 0 to each negative number, and 0.5 to each 0 on the same 7-point scale.
We reported the collected data in [30], together with the analysis of their statistical significance. We
found that most of these data ‘deviate from classicality’, that is, they cannot generally be modeled by
representing conceptual conjunctions and negations with the usual connectives of classical (fuzzy set)
logic. We therefore confirmed the results found by other scholars on the combinations of two concepts
[1, 3, 4, 5, 7] (see Sec. 1). More specifically, we identified ‘overextension’ in the conjunction µ(A and B),
e.g., the exemplar Apple scores µ(A) = 1 with respect to the concept Fruits, µ(B) = 0.23 with respect to
the concept Vegetables, and µ(A and B) = 0.6 with respect to the conjunction Fruits And Vegetables. We
also identified ‘overextension when one concept is negated’, e.g., Pepper scores 0.99 with respect to Spices,
0.58 with respect to Not Herbs, and 0.9 with respect to Spices and Not Herbs, while the membership weights
of Desk with respect to Not Home Furnishing, Furniture and Not Home Furnishing And Furniture is 0.31,
0.95 and 0.75, respectively. More, we detected ‘overextension when both concepts are negated’, e.g., we
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have µ(A′) = 0.12, µ(B′) = 0.81 and µ(A′ and B′) = 0.43 for Goldfish, with respect to Not Pets and Not
Farmyard Animals and Not Pets And Not Farmyard Animals, respectively. Finally, ‘double overextension’
is present in various cases, e.g. the membership weight of Olive with respect to Fruits And Vegetables
is 0.65, which is greater than both 0.53 and 0.63, i.e. the membership weights of Olive with respect to
Fruits and Vegetables. Prize Bull scores 0.13 with respect to Pets and 0.26 with respect to Not Farmyard
Animals, but its membership weight with respect to Pets And Not Farmayard Animals is 0.28. Also, Door
Bell gives 0.32 with respect to Not Home Furnishing and 0.33 with respect to Furniture, while it gives 0.34
with respect to Not Home Furnishing And Furniture.
More generally, the collected membership weights violate the rules of classical probability. To systemati-
cally identify such deviations from classicality we proved the following theorem providing a characterization
of the representability of this set of experimental data in a classical probability space [30].
Theorem. If the membership weights µ(A), µ(B), µ(A′), µ(B′), µ(A and B), µ(A and B′), µ(A′ and B)
and µ(A′ and B′) of an exemplar x with respect to the concepts A, B, A′ and B′ and the conjunctions ‘A
and B’, ‘A and B′’, ‘A′ and B’ and ‘A′ and B′’ are all contained in the interval [0, 1], they are classical
conjunction data if and only if they satisfy the following conditions.
µ(A) = µ(A and B) + µ(A and B′) (1)
µ(B) = µ(A and B) + µ(A′ and B) (2)
µ(A′) = µ(A′ and B′) + µ(A′ and B) (3)
µ(B′) = µ(A′ and B′) + µ(A and B′) (4)
µ(A and B) + µ(A and B′) + µ(A′ and B) + µ(A′ and B′) = 1 (5)
The theorem stated above provides the most symmetric conditions for simultaneously representing the
data in the experiments eXY , X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′ in a single classical space satisfying the axioms of
Kolmogorov [32, 33, 34]. One recognizes at once the marginal law of classical probability in Eqs. (1)–(4),
while Eq. (5) expresses normalization of probabilities. If we introduce the functions
IA = µ(A)− µ(A and B)− µ(A and B′) (6)
IB = µ(B)− µ(A and B)− µ(A′ and B) (7)
IA′ = µ(A
′)− µ(A′ and B′)− µ(A′ and B) (8)
IB′ = µ(B
′)− µ(A′ and B′)− µ(A and B′) (9)
IABA′B′ = 1− µ(A and B)− µ(A and B′)− µ(A′ and B)− µ(A′ and B′) (10)
then the theorem above can be restated by saying that the membership weights µ(X), µ(Y ), µ(X and Y )
are classical conjunction data if and only if IX = IY = IABA′B′ = 0, X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′. These
functions significantly deviate from 0 in our data – Field Mouse has IABA′B′ = −0.46, while Chili Pepper
has IA = −0.73 and Pumpkin has IB′ = −0.13 – which we proved by means a t-student test for paired
samples for means (with Bonferroni correction) [30].
3 A new systematic and stable pattern of violation
The analysis in Sec. 2 follows on the lines traced in [10, 11, 12, 13] with respect to the identification of non-
classical effects in concept combination, such as, conceptual vagueness, guppy-type effects, overextension
and underextension of membership weights, and so on. However, the symmetry of the cognitive experiments
we performed, together with the completeness of the data we collected in these experiments [30], allow us
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to identify a different, unexpected, but even more fundamental, non-classical effect in the combination of
conceptual conjunction and negation. We study this effect in this section.
The values of the functions IA, IB , IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ for the different pairs of concepts are reported
in Appendix A, Tabs. 1–4. By pure inspection of Tabs. 1–4, one can immediately recognize that some
systematicity is involved, namely, the terms IA, IB, IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ in Eqs. (6)–(10) show similar
patterns, since they are characterized by approximately constant numerical values. Numerically, one has
that the mean value of IA is -0.42, across all exemplars, and its standard deviation is 0.09. IB has mean
value -0.43 and standard deviation 0.075. I ′A has mean value -0.35 and standard deviation 0.09. I
′
B has
mean value -0.33 and standard deviation 0.09. Finally, IABA′B′ has mean value -0.81 and standard deviation
0.13. But, a further analysis reveals that this pattern of violation exhibits specific features:
(i) it cannot be explained by means of traditional classical probabilistic approaches, since we should
have IX = IY = IABA′B′ = 0, X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′ in that case, as we have seen in Sec. 2.
(ii) it is ‘highly stable’, in the sense that the functions IA, IB, IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ are very likely
between -1 and 0;
(iii) is is ‘systematic’, in the sense that the values of IA, IB , IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ are approximately
the same across all exemplars;
(iv) it is ‘regular’, in the sense that the functions IA, IB, IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ are independent of the
pair of concepts that are considered.
Observations (i)–(iv) led us to suspect that IX , IY , X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′ and IABA′B′ are indeed
constant functions across all exemplars and pairs of concepts. To this end we firstly performed a ‘linear
regression analysis’ of our data, sorted from smaller to larger, so we could check whether these quantities
can be represented by a straight-line of the form y = mx+ q, with m = 0. This was indeed the case. For
IA, we obtained m = 3.0 · 10−3 with R2 = 0.94; for IB , we obtained m = 2.9 · 10−3 with R2 = 0.93; for
IA′ , we obtained m = 2.6 · 10−3 with R2 = 0.96; for IB′ , we obtained m = 3.1 · 10−3 with R2 = 0.98; for
IABA′B′ , we obtained m = 4 · 10−3 with R2 = 0.92. Successively, we computed the 95%-confidence interval
for these parameters and obtained interval (−0.51,−0.33) for IA, interval (−0.42,−0.28) for IA′ , interval
(−0.52,−0.34) for IB, interval (−0.40,−0.26) for IB′ , and interval (−0.97,−0.64) for IABA′B′ . We can thus
conclude that the measured parameters systematically fall within a narrow band centered at very similar
values. The very high values of R2 are enough to claim that the non-classical effect we have identified here
is statistically significant and not due to random errors. It is however worth to make a subtler and very
interesting distinction between the linear regression analysis of IX , IY , X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′, and IABA′B′ .
Indeed, we calculated the p-values for the corresponding regression analysis. We found that IA and IB give
high p-values, 0.31 and 0.32, respectively, thus confirming the non-significance of the regression analysis
and the independence of the values of IA and IB from the exemplar and pair of concepts. On the contrary,
the regression analysis of IA′ and IB′ (and IABA′B′) gives low p-values (p < 0.05), hence one cannot exclude
that these functions have a weak dependence on the exemplar that is considered. However, the values of
the coefficients of the linear regression is so small that it can be neglected, thus confirming the fact that
IA, IB , IA′ , IB′ , IABA′B′ are constant functions across exemplars and pairs of concepts.
We also calculated the correlation matrix for the values of IX , IY , X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′ and IABA′B′ ,
finding that IX and IY positively related each other and with IABA′B′ , X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′, while IA
has a weak negative relationship with IA′ and IB has a weak negative relationship with IB′ , as expected.
The correlation matrix is reported in Tab. 5.
The pattern above is incredibly stable, systematic and regular, because it is independent on the specific
exemplar, the pair of concepts and the type of conjunction that are considered. This result is really
surprising for our research, since it was completely unexpected a priori. As we have anticipated in Sec.
1, this non-classical effect could not have been isolated in absence of a very symmetric cognitive test,
where all conjunctions and negations are tested together. This is probably why it was not identified in
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traditional cognitive experiments on conceptual combinations [3, 4, 5, 13], which instead aimed at revealing
overextension and underextension, hence they lacked the required symmetry on purpose. And we believe
that this deviation from classical logical and probabilistic rules occurs at a deeper, more fundamental,
level than the known deviations due to overextension and underextension, as mentioned in Sec. 1. In our
opinion, it expresses a fundamental mechanism through which concepts are formed. Therefore, we can
briefly say that the traditional overextension and underextension reveal aspects mainly related to concept
combination, but this non-classical effect captures aspects related to concept formation in its foundation,
independent of meaning. This aspect can be supported with a further statistical test. Indeed, we computed
the p-values corresponding to a t-test for paired samples for means for IX and IY , X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′.
We found that IA versus IB gives a p-value 0.85, and I
′
A versus I
′
B gives a p-value 0.08, hence it is very
reasonable to maintain that the difference between IA and IB and between I
′
A and I
′
B is due to chance.
On the contrary, IA versus I
′
A gives a p-value 3.47EE − 9, IA versus I ′B gives a p-value 3.25EE − 15, IB
versus I ′A gives a p-value 2.44EE − 15, and IB versus I ′B gives a p-value 1.69EE − 13. Hence, it is very
reasonable to maintain that the differences between IA and I
′
A, between IA and I
′
B , between IB and I
′
A,
and between IB and I
′
B are not due to chance. What can we infer from this result? Probably, it is the fact
that a concept or its negation is measured that makes a difference in the values of these functions, which
again supports our claim that the non-classical mechanism we have identified is more due to conceptual
formation than to conceptual combination.
The still much higher p-value of IA versus IB (0.85) as compared to the p-value of IA′ versus IB′ (0.08)
could be due to A and B being ‘completely finished and stable in their formation as a concept’, while A′
and B′ being ‘more momentaneous and hence fragile in their concept formation’ – we plan to investigate
these aspects further in the future. For example, if A and B were taken to be ‘adjectives’ rather than
‘subjectives’ as concepts, their negations might be less fragile.
The results attained here could already be considered as crucial for claiming that the violation of
classicality occurs at a deep structural conceptual level, but this is not the end of the story. We will see
in Sec. 5 that the stability of this violation can exactly be explained in a two-sector Fock space quantum
framework elaborated by ourselves to model conjunctions and disjunctions of two concepts, and recently
extended to also incorporate conceptual negation.
4 A quantum-theoretic modeling for conjunctions and negations
We sketch in this section the quantum-theoretic modeling we developed to represent our experimental data
on the conjunction and the negation of two concepts. Though we introduced some conceptual and technical
novelties in it, our quantum model exhibits the same general features of the model originally elaborated
to represent the conjunction and the disjunction of two concepts, of which the present model is a natural
extension. For the sake of brevity, we will omit presenting proofs and technical steps. The interested reader
can refer to [30].
The quantum-theoretic framework where we represent conceptual entities is mathematically described
by a Fock space, i.e. an infinite direct sum of Hilbert spaces. In the simplest case of two combining
concepts, it is however sufficient to consider a two-sector Fock space F = H⊕ (H⊗H), i.e. the direct sum
⊕ of two Hilbert spaces, an individual Hilbert space H and the tensor product H ⊗H of two isomorphic
copies of H. The Hilbert space H is called the ‘sector 1 of F ’, the tensor product Hilbert space H ⊗H is
called the ‘sector 2 of F ’.
Let us now come to the representation of the conjunctions ‘A and B’, ‘A and B′’, ‘A′ and B’ and
‘A′ and B′’ and the negations A′ and B′ of two concepts A and B. We represent the concepts A, B, A′
and B′ by the unit vectors |A〉, |B〉, |A′〉 and |B′〉, respectively, of the Hilbert space H, and assume that
{|A〉, |B〉, |A′〉, |B′〉} is an orthonormal (ON) set in H. Let x be an exemplar and, for every X = A,A′,
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Y = B,B′, let µ(X) and µ(Y ) be the membership weights of x with respect to the concepts X and Y ,
respectively, and let µ(X and Y ) denote the membership weight of x with respect to the conjunction
‘X and Y ’. We represent the ‘yes-no’ decision measurement of a subject who estimates the membership of
the exemplar x with respect to the concept X or Y by the orthogonal projection operatorM over H (for the
yes outcome, by the orthogonal complement 1−M for the no outcome). By applying standard quantum
probabilistic rules we have, for every X = A,A′ and Y = B,B′, µ(X) = 〈X|M |X〉 and µ(Y ) = 〈Y |M |Y 〉.
For the sake of simplicity, we now split the two-sector Fock space representation in a ‘sector 1 reresen-
tation’ and a ‘sector 2 representation’.
Let us firstly consider ‘sector 1 representation’. For every X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, the conjunction
‘X and Y ’ of the concepts X and Y is represented by the normalized superposition vector 1√
2
(|X〉 + |Y 〉)
in sector 1. Therefore, sector 1 representation models conceptual combinations as the emergence of a
new concept, namely the ‘conjunction concept’. The ‘yes-no’ decision measurement of a subject who
estimates the membership of the exemplar x with respect to the conjunction ‘X and Y ’ is represented by
the orthogonal projection operator M over H. By applying standard quantum probabilistic rules we have
that, for every X = A,A′ and Y = B,B′, the membership weight of x with respect to the conjunction
‘X and Y ’ is given by
µ(X and Y ) =
1
2
(〈X|+ 〈Y |)M(|X〉 + |Y 〉) = 1
2
(µ(X) + µ(Y )) + ℜ〈X|M |Y 〉 (11)
in sector 1, where ℜ〈X|M |Y 〉 is the real part of the complex number 〈X|M |Y 〉 and is called the ‘interference
term’ by analogy with the traditional interference of quantum physics [35].
Let us now come to ‘sector 2 representation’. For every X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, the conjunction
‘X and Y ’ of the concepts X and Y is represented by the (generally) entangled unit vector |C〉 of H⊗H in
sector 2. The ‘yes-no’ decision measurement of a subject who estimates the membership of the exemplar x
with respect to the conjunction ‘X and Y ’ is represented by the orthogonal projection operator MX ⊗MY
over H ⊗ H, X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, where MA = M = MB and MA′ = 1 − M = MB′ , in sector 2.
Therefore, sector 2 representation models conceptual combinations by applying the rules of logic – e.g.,
the decision about memberhip of the negation A′ is represented by the orthogonal complement 1 −M of
M , where M corresponds to the membership of the positive concept A – though in a probabilistic form.
By applying standard quantum probabilistic rules we have that, for every X = A,A′ and Y = B,B′, the
membership weight of x with respect to the conjunction ‘X and Y ’ is given by
µ(X and Y ) = 〈C|MX ⊗MY |C〉 (12)
in sector 2.
Let us now consider the overall representation in the two-sector Fock space F = H ⊕ (H ⊗ H). For
every X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, the conjunction ‘X and Y ’ of the concepts X and Y is represented by the
normalized superposition vector
Ψ(X,Y ) = mXY e
iθ|C〉+ nXY eiρ 1√
2
(|X〉+ |Y 〉) (13)
where m2XY + n
2
XY = 1. The ‘yes-no’ decision measurement of a subject who estimates the membership
of the exemplar x with respect to the conjunction ‘X and Y ’ is represented by the orthogonal projection
operator (MX⊗MY )⊕M over F , X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, whereMA =M =MB andMA′ = 1−M =MB′ .
Again by applying standard quantum probabilistic rules we have that, for every X = A,A′ and Y = B,B′,
the membership weight of x with respect to the conjunction ‘X and Y ’ is given by
µ(X and Y ) = 〈Ψ(X,Y )|(MX ⊗MY )⊕M |Ψ(X,Y )〉 =
= m2XY 〈C|MX ⊗MY |C〉+ n2XY
(1
2
(µ(X) + µ(Y )) + ℜ〈X|M |Y 〉
)
(14)
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We proved in [30] that a general two-sector Fock space modeling for our set of experimental data can be
constructed over the complex Hilbert space C8. Indeed, let us denote by {|i〉}i=1,...,8 the canonical basis of
C
8 and, for every X = A,A′ and Y = B,B′, we choose |X〉 = eiφX ∑8i=1 xi|i〉 and |Y 〉 = eiφY
∑8
i=1 yi|i〉
in this canonical basis. We also choose M =
∑8
i=5 |i〉〈i|, thus 1 − M =
∑4
i=1 |i〉〈i|, and write |C〉 =∑8
i,j=1 cije
iγij |i〉 ⊗ |j〉. By making the required calculations, one can show that, for every X = A,A′ and
Y = B,B′, Eq. (14) takes the form
µ(X and Y ) = m2XY αXY + n
2
XY
(1
2
(µ(X) + µ(Y )) + βXY cosφXY
)
(15)
where m2XY + n
2
XY = 1, αXY = αXY (cij), 0 ≤ αXY ≤ 1, βXY = βXY (xi, yi), −1 ≤ βXY ≤ 1, and
cosφXY = φX − φY [30].
Almost all the experimental data we collected can be represented in our two-sector Fock space model.
For the sake of brevity, we only report the representation for the cases that were double overextended,
hence classically highly problematical.
Olive. m2AB = 0.18, n
2
AB = 0.82, αAB = 0.19, βAB = 0.31, φAB = 57.31
◦, m2AB′ = 1, n
2
AB′ = 0,
αAB′ = 0.34, βAB′ = 0.35, φAB′ = 95.32
◦, m2A′B = 0.6, n
2
A′B = 0.4, αA′B = 0.44, βA′B = −0.33,
φA′B = 103.43
◦, m2A′B′ = 0.27, n
2
A′B′ = 0.73, αA′B′ = 0.03, βA′B′ = 0.35, φA′B′ = 85.56
◦.
Prize Bull. m2AB = 0.22, n
2
AB = 0.78, αAB = 0.06, βAB = −0.29, φAB = 105.71◦, m2AB′ = 0.17,
n2AB′ = 0.83, αAB′ = 0.07, βAB′ = 0.16, φAB′ = 40.23
◦, m2A′B = 0.29, n
2
A′B = 0.71, αA′B = 0.7,
βA′B = −0.14, φA′B = 111.25◦, m2A′B′ = 0.27, n2A′B′ = 0.73, αA′B′ = 0.16, βA′B′ = −0.28, φA′B′ = 52.51◦.
Door Bell. m2AB = 0.23, n
2
AB = 0.77, αAB = 0.12, βAB = −0.32, φAB = 102.81◦, m2AB′ = 0.83,
n2AB′ = 0.17, αAB′ = 0.63, βAB′ = 0.18, φAB′ = 117.67
◦, m2A′B = 0.42, n
2
A′B = 0.58, αA′B = 0.21,
βA′B = 0.27, φA′B = 67.37
◦, m2A′B′ = 0.18, n
2
A′B′ = 0.82, αA′B′ = 0.04, βA′B′ = 0.31, φA′B′ = 77.65
◦.
The interested reader can find a complete representation in [30], together with further technical details
on our quantum-theoretic framework. We instead discuss here two important aspects of our quantum-
theoretic modeling, namely, the connections between modeling parameters and data points, and some
intuitive reasons for this choice of the concepts representation.
Let us preliminarily observe that, for every X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, there are three data points,
µ(X), µ(Y ) and µ(X and Y ), which are connected with the modeling parameters αXY , βXY , m
2
XY ,
n2XY = 1−m2XY and cosφXY by Eq. (15). The parameters are bounded by the following conditions:
−1 ≤ βXY ≤ 1 0 ≤ αXY ≤ 1 (16)∑
X=A,A
∑
Y=B,B′ αXY = 1 (17)
φXY = arccos
{
µ(X and Y )− 1
2
(µ(X)+µ(Y ))−m2
XY
[αXY − 12 (µ(X)+µ(Y ))]
}
(1−m2
XY
)βXY
(18)
Secondly, let us discuss more extensively the reasons why we represent a conceptual conjunction by means
of a superposed state vector in sector 1 of Fock space and by means of an entangled state vector in sector 2.
For every X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, the superposition state vector 1√
2
(|X〉 + |Y 〉) represents the conjunction
‘X and Y ’ in sector 1. This choice expresses the fact that sector 1 of Fock space formalizes the ‘genuinely
emergent aspects of conceptual conjunctions’, – 1√
2
(|X〉 + |Y 〉) is a new state vector, obtained from the
state vectors |X〉 and |Y 〉 but without requiring any logical rule being satisfied. This will be evident in Sec.
5 after introducing ‘quantum emergent thought’. The choice of representing the conjunction ‘X and Y ’
by an entangled state vector |C〉 in sector 2 allows instead the possibility of describing events that are not
statistically independent in this sector, – if we represent ‘X and Y ’ by the product state vector |X〉 ⊗ |Y 〉
in sector 2, this leads to a probability µ(X)µ(Y ) in this sector. In addition, there is a striking connection
between logic and classical probability when conjunction and negation of concepts are considered together.
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Namely, the logical probabilistic structure of sector 2 of Fock space sets the limits of classical probabilistic
models, and vice versa. In other words, the experimentally collected membership weights µ(X), µ(Y ) and
µ(X and Y ), X = A,A′, Y = B,B′, satisfy Eqs. (1)–(5), if and only if an entangled state vector |C〉 and
a decision measurement projection operator M exist such that µ(X), µ(Y ) and µ(X and Y ), X = A,A′,
Y = B,B′, can be represented in sector 2 of Fock space (see [30] for the proof). This will be evident in
Sec. 5 after introducing ‘quantum logical thought’.
5 Explaining the observed patterns
Our experimental data on conjunctions and negations of natural concepts confirm that classical proba-
bility does not generally work when humans combine concepts, as we have seen in Sec. 2. However, we
have also proved in Sec. 3 that the deviations from classicality cannot be reduced to overextension and
underextension, while our quantum-theoretic framework in two-sector Fock space has received remarkable
confirmation, as we have seen in Sec. 4. It is now worth to provide an explanation for the validity of our
quantum cognition approach.
We recently put forward an explanatory hypothesis with respect to the deviations from classical logical
reasoning that were observed in human cognition [10, 11, 31]. According to our explanatory hypothesis,
human reasoning is a specifically structured superposition of two processes, a ‘logical reasoning’ and an
‘emergent reasoning’. The former ‘logical reasoning’ combines cognitive entities, such as concepts, com-
binations of concepts, or propositions, by applying the rules of logic, though generally in a probabilistic
form. The latter ‘emergent reasoning’ enables formation of combined cognitive entities as newly emerging
entities, in the case of concepts, new concepts, in the case of propositions, new propositions, carrying new
meaning, linked to the meaning of the constituent cognitive entities, but with a linkage not defined by the
algebra of logic. The two mechanisms act simultaneously and in superposition in human thought during
a reasoning process, the first one is guided by an algebra of ‘logic’, the second one follows a mechanism
of ‘emergence’. And, more, human reasoning can be exactly mathematically formalized in a two-sector
Fock space. More specifically, sector 1 of Fock space models ‘conceptual emergence’, while sector 2 of Fock
space models a conceptual combination from the combining concepts by requiring the rules of logic for the
logical connective used for the combining to be satisfied in a probabilistic setting. The relative prevalence
of emergence or logic in a specific cognitive process is measured by the ‘degree of participation’ of sectors
1 and 2, respectively. The abundance of evidence of deviations from classical logical reasoning in concrete
human decisions (paradoxes, fallacies, effects, contradictions), together with our results, led us to draw the
conclusion that emergence constitutes the dominant dynamics of human reasoning, while logic is only a
secondary form of dynamics.
We now prove that the two-layered structure above explains and justifies the results and mathematics
in Secs. 3 and 4.
Let us preliminarily observe that, if one reflects on how we represented conceptual negation in Sec. 4,
one realizes at once that its modeling directly and naturally follows from the general assumption stated
above. Indeed, suppose that a given subject is asked to estimate whether a given exemplar x is a member
of the concepts A, B′, ‘A and B′ (a completely equivalent explanation can be given for the conjunctions
‘A′ and B’ and ‘A′ and B′’). Then, our quantum mathematics can be interpreted by assuming that a
‘quantum logical thought’ acts, where the subject considers two copies of x and estimates whether the
first copy belongs to A and the second copy of x ‘does not’ belong to B. But also a ‘quantum emergent
thought’ acts, where the subject estimates whether the exemplar x belongs to the newly emergent concept
‘A and B′’. The place whether these superposed processes can be suitably structured is the two-sector
Fock space. First sector of Fock space hosts the latter process, second sector hosts the former, and the
weights m2AB′ and n
2
AB′ indicate whether the overall process is mainly guided by logic or emergence.
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Let us now come to the significantly stable deviations from Eqs. (1)–(5) in Sec. 3. We have argued
that these deviations occur at a different, deeper, level which could not be identified by only detecting
overextension and underextension in combinations, and they are very likely to express a general mecha-
nism determining how the human mind forms concepts. This would already be convincing even without
mentioning a Fock space modeling. But, this very stable pattern can exactly be explained in our two-sector
Fock space framework by assuming that emergence plays a primary role in the human reasoning process,
but also aspects of logic are systematically present in human decision processes. We provide in the following
a heuristic reasoning leading to this conclusion.
Suppose that only emergent reasoning is present in human thought, and represent it in sector 1 of Fock
space. Consider, e.g., Eq. (1), and use Eq. (11) in it. We get
IA = µ(A)− µ(A and B)− µ(A and B′) =
= µ(A)− 12 (µ(A) + µ(B))−ℜ〈A|M |B〉 − 12(µ(A) + µ(B′))−ℜ〈A|M |B′〉 =
= −12(µ(B) + µ(B′))− (ℜ〈A|M |B〉+ ℜ〈A|M |B′〉) (19)
Let us now consider the interference terms and set ℜ〈A|M |B〉 = IAB and ℜ〈A|M |B′〉 = IAB′ . Further, let
us consider the deviations of µ(B) and µ(B′) from 12 , i.e. set IB = µ(B) − 12 and IB′ = µ(B′) − 12 . This
coincides with introducing a purely mathematical notion of ‘interference of an individual concept’. Then,
IA = −1
2
−
[IB + IB′
2
+ IAB + IAB′
]
(20)
Hence, the value of IA oscillates around the value -0.5 due to the interference terms IB, IB′ , IAB and
IAB′ . When one considers all exemplars, it is reasonable to assume that these interference terms offset
each other, which entails IA ≈ −0.5. This assumption is confirmed by the experimental data. If one look
at these data (see [30]), one finds that the term
IB+IB′
2 + IAB + IAB′ is indeed very small – e.g., Shelves
and Fox give -0.01, Cinnamon gives 0, Blue-tit, Raising and Almond give 0.01.
A conclusion follows at once. By assuming that only emergent reasoning is present, we get IA ≈ −0.5.
One can use a similar heuristic reasoning to show that the same result holds for IB , I
′
A and IB′ . Analogously,
IABA′B′ = −1−
∑
X=A,A′
∑
Y=B,B′
IXY − 2
( ∑
X=A,A′
IX
2
+
∑
Y=B,B′
IY
2
)
≈ −1 (21)
where IY = µ(Y )− 12 , Y = B,B′.
But, now, comparison with the experimental values of IX , IY and IABA′B′ , X = A,A
′, Y = B,B′, in
Sec. 3 reveals that a component of sector 2 of Fock space is also present, which is generally smaller than the
component of sector 1 but systematic across all exemplars. The consequence is immediate: both emergence
and logic play a role in the decision process – emergence is dominant, but also logic is systematically present.
Due to the nature of its appearance, we believe that this finding is deep and fundamental concerning
the dynamics of conceptuality in human thought, and it deserves further investigation in the near future.
But, already at the present stage of our research, we have good reasons to believe that our two-sector Fock
space framework goes essentially beyond faithful representation of one set or more sets of experimental
data. It reveals fundamental aspects of the mechanisms through which concepts are formed, combine and
constitute the substance of human thought.
6 Conclusive remarks
In this paper we have analyzed a set of experimental data we collected on combinations, i.e. conjunctions
and negations, of two concepts. We have isolated five classicality conditions that should be satisfied in
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order to represent the collected data in a classical Kolmogorovian probability framework. These conditions
were systematically violated in our experiments, but the usual overextension is not the only non-classical
effect at play. Indeed, the deviation from the five classicality conditions we have identified is surprisingly
independent of the specific exemplar that is considered, nor it depends on the specific pair of concepts
that are measured. In other words, the numerical value of, say IA, is the same when different exemplars
are considered, and it is not affected by the specific pair of concepts that are measured. In addition,
IA and IB , and also IA′ and IB′ , have approximately the same numerical value, and the slight deviation
between their values can be attributed to the fact that a positive or a negative concept is considered. As a
consequence, this deviation of classicality cannot be attributed to an underlying non-classical mechanism
of conceptual combination, because the numerical value of the functions IA, IB , etc. would then depend
on whether ‘A and B’, or ‘A and B′’, or ‘A′ and B’, or ‘A′ and B′’, is considered – in IA′ more negative
concepts appear than in IA. This is why, we think, this deeper phenomenon could not have been detected
in a less symmetric experimental setting only aiming at detecting overextension, as we have explained in
Sec. 1. As it is reasonably independent of the specific conceptual combination that is considered, this
non-classical effect unveils in our opinion aspects of the mechanisms of conceptual formation, and it can be
numerically represented in our quantum-theoretic framework in two-sector Fock space. In addition, it can
be explained by assuming that human reasoning is a specifically structured superposition of a ‘dominant
emergent reasoning’ and a ‘secondary logical reasoning’, as we have argued in Sec. 5.
It is worth observing, to conclude, that our explanatory hypothesis on the existence of two supersposed
processes in human reasoning has appeared in different forms in cognitive psychology and is referred to
as ‘dual route models of cognition’. Already at the beginning of the last century William James proposed
a ‘dual process theory’, where he introduced the idea of ‘two legs of thought’, a ‘conceptual leg’, being
exclusive, static, classical and following the rules of logic, and a ‘perceptual leg’, being intuitive and
penetrating. He expressed the opinion that ‘just as we need two legs to walk, we also need both conceptual
and perceptual modes to think’ [36]. Please, notice that James used the connotation ‘conceptual’ to
indicate the logical mode, contrary to us using ‘conceptual’ mainly with respect to the emergent mode.
Recently, more sophisticated dual models of cognition were put forward among the other by Sloman,
who distinguished between ‘associative system of reasoning’ and ‘rule based system of reasoning’ [37],
and by Evans, who proposed a theory of reasoning with ‘heuristic processes’ and ‘analytic processes’
[38]. Notwithstanding their similarities, we believe there are some fundamental differences between earlier
dual route models of cognition and ours. First of all, it is the specific mathematical structure of our
quantum model that defines the structural aspects of the two layers of reasoning that we put forward here
and how they are interrelated. In other words, the nature of this double layered structure follows from
a mathematical model for experimental data on the non-classical effects identified in human cognition.
Secondly, and directly related to the first difference, in our hypothesized double structure, conceptual
reasoning and logical reasoning are superposed and entangled in a standard quantum-mechanical sense,
rather than having an individual (or separated, or parallel) existence.
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A Data tables
Table 1: Values of IA, IB , IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ for the pair (Home Furnishing, Furniture).
(Home Furnishing, Furniture)
Exemplar IA IB IA′ IB′ IABA′B′
Mantelpiece -0.56 -0.31 -0.31 -0.46 -0.89
Window Seat -0.44 -0.36 -0.33 -0.35 -0.74
Painting -0.44 -0.48 -0.35 -0.33 -0.94
Light Fixture -0.48 -0.45 -0.33 -0.28 -0.84
Kitchen Counter -0.42 -0.44 -0.39 -0.24 -0.79
Bath Tub -0.45 -0.44 -0.37 -0.41 -0.83
Deck Chair -0.42 -0.38 -0.44 -0.39 -0.86
Shelves -0.38 -0.43 -0.36 -0.34 -0.83
Rug -0.48 -0.54 -0.45 -0.28 -1
Bed -0.39 -0.48 -0.49 -0.39 -0.9
Wall-Hangings -0.39 -0.44 -0.38 -0.27 -0.85
Space Rack -0.53 -0.41 -0.37 -0.44 -0.9
Ashtray -0.34 -0.45 -0.43 -0.35 -0.84
Bar -0.51 -0.39 -0.43 -0.51 -1.03
Lamp -0.51 -0.51 -0.45 -0.41 -1.05
Wall Mirror -0.58 -0.51 -0.45 -0.35 -1.06
Door Bell -0.39 -0.51 -0.53 -0.36 -0.99
Hammock -0.48 -0.5 -0.47 -0.41 -0.98
Desk -0.32 -0.58 -0.59 -0.39 -1
Refrigerator -0.47 -0.4 -0.46 -0.39 -0.93
Park Bench -0.31 -0.45 -0.36 -0.22 -0.79
Waste Paper Basket -0.31 -0.51 -0.59 -0.27 -0.95
Sculpture -0.48 -0.58 -0.49 -0.43 -1.13
Sink Unit -0.46 -0.41 -0.41 -0.36 -0.91
Table 2: Values of IA, IB , IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ for the pair (Spices, Herbs).
(Spices, Herbs)
Exemplar IA IB IA′ IB′ IABA′B′
Molasses -0.41 -0.36 -0.31 -0.43 -0.75
Salt -0.26 -0.28 -0.33 -0.37 -0.61
Peppermint -0.41 -0.33 -0.33 -0.43 -0.78
Curry -0.45 -0.42 -0.34 -0.31 -0.79
Oregano -0.38 -0.43 -0.36 -0.35 -0.76
MSG -0.36 -0.34 -0.37 -0.45 -0.76
Chili Pepper -0.73 -0.54 -0.35 -0.46 -1.1
Mustard -0.49 -0.44 -0.3 -0.41 -0.83
Mint -0.46 -0.47 -0.32 -0.34 -0.85
Cinnamon -0.48 -0.41 -0.34 -0.43 -0.84
Parsley -0.4 -0.5 -0.36 -0.35 -0.84
Saccarin -0.43 -0.34 -0.36 -0.46 -0.81
Poppy Seeds -0.43 -0.43 -0.29 -0.4 -0.84
Pepper -0.61 -0.41 -0.21 -0.46 -0.91
Turmeric -0.54 -0.49 -0.38 -0.47 -0.91
Sugar -0.46 -0.26 -0.31 -0.44 -0.81
Vinegar -0.26 -0.31 -0.33 -0.36 -0.65
Sesame Seeds -0.49 -0.44 -0.33 -0.4 -0.91
Lemon Juice -0.3 -0.34 -0.46 -0.43 -0.78
Chocolate -0.39 -0.36 -0.37 -0.44 -0.81
Horseradish -0.4 -0.47 -0.37 -0.44 -0.86
Vanilla -0.48 -0.44 -0.38 -0.48 -0.91
Chives -0.38 -0.51 -0.53 -0.33 -0.99
Root Ginger -0.43 -0.54 -0.41 -0.37 -0.91
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Table 3: Values of IA, IB , IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ for the pair (Pets, Farmyard Animals).
(Pets, Farmyard Animals)
Exemplar IA IB IA′ IB′ IABA′B′
Goldfish -0.41 -0.43 -0.48 -0.53 -0.94
Robin -0.39 -0.41 -0.22 -0.18 -0.59
Blue-tit -0.31 -0.3 -0.24 -0.24 -0.56
Collie Dog -0.48 -0.34 -0.34 -0.33 -0.79
Camel -0.36 -0.46 -0.3 -0.24 -0.7
Squirrel -0.24 -0.34 -0.31 -0.2 -0.59
Guide Dog for Blind -0.35 -0.39 -0.36 -0.36 -0.76
Spider -0.31 -0.36 -0.23 -0.19 -0.58
Homing Pigeon -0.41 -0.44 -0.31 -0.25 -0.74
Monkey -0.29 -0.31 -0.25 -0.31 -0.59
Circus Horse -0.39 -0.38 -0.26 -0.23 -0.69
Prize Bull -0.57 -0.49 -0.28 -0.35 -0.86
Rat -0.29 -0.39 -0.31 -0.23 -0.65
Badger -0.24 -0.3 -0.23 -0.19 -0.5
Siamese Cat -0.5 -0.41 -0.36 -0.46 -0.9
Race Horse -0.54 -0.46 -0.26 -0.24 -0.79
Fox -0.33 -0.34 -0.19 -0.19 -0.51
Donkey -0.45 -0.48 -0.26 -0.25 -0.78
Field Mouse -0.3 -0.24 -0.18 -0.23 -0.46
Ginger Tom-cat -0.34 -0.34 -0.34 -0.32 -0.71
Husky in Slead team -0.43 -0.49 -0.36 -0.28 -0.8
Cart Horse -0.46 -0.5 -0.31 -0.28 -0.79
Chicken -0.46 -0.44 -0.19 -0.23 -0.68
Doberman Guard Dog -0.47 -0.49 -0.54 -0.51 -1.03
Table 4: Values of IA, IB, IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ for the pair (Fruits, Vegetables).
(Fruits, Vegetables)
Exemplar IA IB IA′ IB′ IABA′B′
Apple -0.49 -0.5 -0.3 -0.24 -0.79
Parsley -0.53 -0.51 -0.29 -0.29 -0.83
Olive -0.46 -0.53 -0.41 -0.26 -0.86
Chili Pepper -0.53 -0.46 -0.29 -0.29 -0.83
Broccoli -0.58 -0.49 -0.21 -0.28 -0.83
Root Ginger -0.46 -0.46 -0.33 -0.24 -0.74
Pumpkin -0.43 -0.51 -0.29 -0.13 -0.68
Raisin -0.39 -0.51 -0.46 -0.33 -0.86
Acorn -0.36 -0.44 -0.39 -0.36 -0.84
Mustard -0.44 -0.45 -0.43 -0.38 -0.81
Rice -0.32 -0.34 -0.28 -0.29 -0.61
Tomato -0.56 -0.55 -0.33 -0.24 -0.86
Coconut -0.33 -0.44 -0.37 -0.33 -0.79
Mushroom -0.33 -0.33 -0.26 -0.24 -0.61
Wheat -0.38 -0.44 -0.38 -0.26 -0.73
Green Pepper -0.5 -0.49 -0.23 -0.26 -0.76
Watercress -0.45 -0.51 -0.24 -0.2 -0.73
Peanut -0.41 -0.43 -0.3 -0.33 -0.8
Black Pepper -0.38 -0.46 -0.31 -0.23 -0.71
Garlic -0.5 -0.49 -0.33 -0.31 -0.83
Yam -0.45 -0.58 -0.38 -0.24 -0.91
Elderberry -0.36 -0.52 -0.39 -0.28 -0.8
Almond -0.33 -0.42 -0.43 -0.37 -0.8
Lentils -0.38 -0.41 -0.33 -0.26 -0.71
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Table 5: Correlation matrix for IA, IB, IA′ , IB′ and IABA′B′ .
IA IB IA′ I
′
B
IABA′B′
IA 1 0.45 -0.03 0.33 0.61
IB 0.45 1 0.41 -0.07 0.63
IA′ -0.03 0.41 1 0.48 0.71
I′B 0.33 -0.07 0.48 1 0.61
IABA′B′ 0.61 0.63 0.71 0.61 1
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